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DICHOTOMOUS THEORIES OF CULTURAL AND LEGAL SUPERSYSTEMS

Cătălin BORDEIANU
PhD, University Professor,
University of European Political and Economic Studies „Constantin Stere”,
Chisinau, Republica Moldova
e-mail: *catalinbordeianu1@yahoo.com*
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5122-5689

Alexandru Ştefan BĂIŞANU
PhD, Associate Professor,
University „Stefan cel Mare”, Suceava, Romania
e-mail: *baisanu@yahoo.com*
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4230-6249

Among the modern theories of cultural systems and supersystems, dichotomous models occupy one of the most important places. Almost all recent theories of this kind represent variations and processing of the Marx-Engels division. The most important of these theories are those of A. Coste, Z. Weber, A. Weber, R. M. MacIver, W. Ogburn, F. S. Chopin, T. Veblen, M. Tugan-Baranovsky, and others. Even within the same culture, say sensitive, any of its main systems divides (sociologically) its own values into 'values-purposes' and 'values-means', into positive and negative, leading to a pyramid of values. In each class of sociocultural phenomena, not all its values are considered equal, but stratified in a hierarchical pyramid, starting with the negative and mediocre 'values-means' and ending with the final, supreme 'means-purposes'. These authors support the dichotomous division of the total sociocultural world into two different supersystems. The common feature of all dichotomous theories is that, without any explicit distinction between sociocultural and conglomerate systems, they divide the total culture of all societies into two different classes, and claim that all phenomena, within each class, are interdependent and change within the same pattern, given that the patterns of change in each class are fundamentally different. All these considerations and empirical evidence show the injustice of dichotomous theories of progress and lagging behind. At best, they fall into the well-known mistake of elevating a particular fact to the rank of a universal rule.

Keywords: *society, civilization, sociocultural phenomena, dichotomous theories, cultural system, legal system, supersystem.*

TEORII DIHOTOMICE ALE SUPERSISTEMELOR CULTURALE ŞI JURIDICE

Printre teoriile moderne ale sistemelor şi supersistemelor culturale, modelele dihotomice ocupă unul dintre cele mai importante locuri. Aproape toate teoriile recente de acest fel reprezintă variaţii şi prelucrări ale diviziei Marx-Engels. Cele mai importante dintre aceste teorii sunt cele ale lui A. Coste, Z. Weber, A. Weber, R. M. MacIver, W. Ogburn, F. S. Chopin, T. Veblen, M. Tugan-Baranovsky şi alţii. Chiar şi în cadrul aceleiaşi culturi, să zicem sensibile, oricare dintre sistemele sale principale îşi împarte (sociologic) propriile valori în "valori-scopuri" şi"valori-mijloace", în pozitive şi negative, ducând la o piramidă de valori. În fiecare clasă de fenomene socioculturale, nu toate valorile sale sunt considerate egale, ci stratificate într-o piramidă ierarhică, începând cu 'valorile-mijloace' negative şi mediocre şi terminând cu "mijloacele-scopuri"finale, supreme. Aceşti autori susţin diviziunea dihotomică a lumii socioculturale totale în două supersisteme diferite. Trăsătura comună a tuturor teoriilor dihotomice este

că, fără nicio distincție explicită între sistemele socioculturale și conglomerate, ele împart cultura totală a tuturor societăților în două clase diferite și susțin că toate fenomenele, în cadrul fiecărei clase, sunt interdependente și se schimbă în cadrul aceluiași model, având în vedere că modelele de schimbare din fiecare clasă sunt fundamental diferite. Toate aceste considerații și dovezi empirice arată nedreptatea teoriilor dihotomice ale progresului și rămânerea în urmă. În cel mai bun caz, ei se încadrează în binecunoscuta greșeală de a ridica un anumit fapt la rangul unei reguli universale.

Cuvinte-cheie: *societate, civilizație, fenomene socioculturale, teorii dihotomice, sistem cultural, sistem juridic, supersistem.*

THÉORIES DICHOTOMIQUES DES SUPERSYSTÈMES CULTURELS ET JURIDIQUES

Parmi les théories modernes des systèmes culturels et des supersystèmes, les modèles dichotomiques occupent l'une des places les plus importantes. Presque toutes les théories récentes de ce type représentent des variations et un traitement de la division Marx-Engels. Les plus importantes de ces théories ont celles de A. Coste, Z. Weber, A. Weber, R. M. MacIver, W. Ogburn, F. S. Chopin, T. Veblen, M. Tugan-Baranovsky et d'autres. Même au sein d'une même culture, disons sensible, l'un de ses principaux systèmes divise (sociologiquement) ses propres valeurs en "valeurs-buts" et "valeurs-moyens", en positif et négatif, conduisant à une pyramide de valeurs. Dans chaque classe de phénomènes socioculturels, toutes ses valeurs ne sont pas considérées comme égales, mais stratifiées en une pyramide hiérarchique, commençant par les "valeurs-moyens" négatifs et médiocres et se terminant par les "moyens-buts" finaux et suprêmes. Ces auteurs soutiennent la division dichotomique du monde socioculturel total en deux supersystèmes différents. Le trait commun de toutes ces théories est que, sans distinction explicite entre systèmes socioculturels et systèmes de conglomérats, elles divisent la culture totale de toutes les sociétés en deux classes différentes, et prétendent que tous les phénomènes, au sein de chaque classe, sont interdépendants et changent au sein du même modèle, étant donné que les modèles de changement dans chaque classe sont fondamentalement différents. Toutes ces considérations et preuves empiriques montrent l'injustice des théories dichotomiques du progrès et du retard. Au mieux, ils tombent dans l'erreur bien connue d'élever un fait particulier au rang de règle universelle.

Mots-clés: *société, civilisation, phénomènes socioculturels, théories dichotomiques, système culturel, système juridique, supersystème.*

ДИХОТОМИЧЕСКИЕ ТЕОРИИ КУЛЬТУРНЫХ И ПРАВОВЫХ СУПЕРСИСТЕМ

Среди современных теорий культурных систем и суперсистем дихотомические модели занимают одно из важнейших мест. Почти все новейшие такого рода теории представляют собой вариации и переработку Маркса-Энгельса. Важнейшие из этих теорий — теории А. Косте, З. Вебера, А. Вебера, Р. М. Макивера, У. Огберна, Ф. С. Шопена, Т. Веблена, М. Туган-Барановского и др. Даже в пределах одной и той же культуры, скажем сенситивной, любая из ее основных систем делит (социологически) собственные ценности на «ценности-цели» и «ценности-средства», на позитивы и негативы, образовывая пирамиду ценностей. В каждом классе социокультурных явлений не все его значения считаются равноценными, а стратифицированными в иерархической пирамиде, начиная с отрицательных и посредственных «средств-ценностей» и заканчивая высшими «средствами-целями». Эти авторы поддерживают дихотомическое разделение всего социокультурного мира на две разные суперсистемы. Общей чертой всех дихотомических теорий является то, что без какого-либо явного различия между социокультурными и конгломератными системами они делят общую культуру всех обществ на два разных класса и утверждают, что все явления внутри каждого класса взаимозависимы и изменяются в рамках одной и той же модели, учитывая, что закономерности изменений в каждом классе принципиально различны. Все эти соображения и эмпирические данные свидетельствуют о несправедливости дихотомических теорий прогресса и отставания. В лучшем случае, они впадают в знаменитую ошибку возведения известного факта в ранг всеобщего правила.

Ключевые слова: *общество, цивилизация, социокультурные явления, дихотомические теории, культурная система, правовая система, суперсистема.*

Introduction

Among the modern theories of cultural systems and supersystems, dichotomous models occupy one of the most important places. Almost all recent theories of this kind represent variations and processing of the Marx-Engels division. The most important of these theories are those of A. Coste, Z. Weber, A. Weber, R. M. MacIver, W. Ogburn, F. S. Chopin, T. Veblen, M. Tugan-Baranovsky, and others. Even within the same culture, say sensitive, any of its main systems divides (sociologically) its own values into ‘values-purposes’ and ‘values-means’, into positive and negative, leading to a pyramid of values. In each class of sociocultural phenomena, not all its values are considered equal, but stratified in a hierarchical pyramid, starting with the negative and mediocre ‘values-means’ and ending with the final, supreme ‘means-purposes’. These authors support the dichotomous division of the total sociocultural world into two different supersystems. The common feature of all dichotomous theories is that, without any explicit distinction between sociocultural and conglomerate systems, they divide the total culture of all societies into two different classes, and claim that all phenomena, within each class, are interdependent and change within the same pattern, given that the patterns of change in each class are fundamentally different. All these considerations and empirical evidence show the injustice of dichotomous theories of progress and lagging behind. At best, they fall into the well-known mistake of elevating a particular fact to the rank of a universal rule.

Variations in dichotomous theories

Dichotomous models occupy one of the most important places among the modern theories of cultural systems and supersystems,. Some of the ideas, before these theories appeared, are found in the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius, of Hindu and Buddhist thinkers, and in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and other Greco-Roman thinkers. In a more developed form, it is found in the writings of various social thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in the first half of the nineteenth century. Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, by dividing sociocultural relations into two main classes, *the relations of production,* (which) constitute the economic structure of society, and *the ideological superstructure*, which consists of *legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical forms and relations*, have given new life and full development to the economic variant of dichotomous theories[1]. Almost all recent theories of this kind represent variations and processing of the Marx-Engels division. The most important of these theories are those of A.Coste, Z.Weber, A.Weber, R.M.MacIver, W.Ogburn, F.S. Chopin, T. Veblen, M. Tugan-Baranovsky and others.

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Coste divides all sociocultural phenomena into two systems and conglomerates. By social *facts*, Coste means the phenomena of government, the production and distribution of economic or useful products, beliefs and solidarity. By *ideological* facts, he means the phenomena of impractical or useless arts, such as poetry, philosophy, and various ideologies, including those of the theoretical and non-applied sciences, which are not useful or utilitarian. While the social phenomena of government, economy, faith and solidarity are closely linked and correlated with each other in their

[1] See a comparative analysis of the early sketch of Marx’s theory with its later version in G. Gurwitch, La vocation actuelle de la sociologie (Paris, 1963) pp. 220-332.

change, fluctuation and evolution, ideological phenomena do not show any close correlation with social phenomena. In other words, *sociality* and *ideological mentality* are independent of each other[2]. Changes in ideological phenomena take place sporadically, irregularly and without continuity, constant direction or accumulation. They also appear and fall down. The most socially powerful societies are often overshadowed in terms of ideological achievements and the people of genius ideology, while socially weak societies often have an abundance of great ideological creations - in art, in a system theological of religion, in literature and in theoretical science or philosophy. *The social system*, with its elements, on the contrary, shows continuity, regularity, accumulation, and a linear direction of progress. In this linear direction, *the social system* has passed, in all its compartments - economic, government, beliefs, solidarity - through five stages, from the town to the Federation of Metropolises. At each stage, each of these compartments or subsystems is integrated with the others and changes with them.

Similar to Coste's theory in the main aspects are the theories of L. Weber, A. Weber, W. Ogburn, R. MacIver and many others[3].

According to Louis Weber, a person and his/her spirit have a double nature: *homo faber*, the technical person and the worker, on the other hand, and *homo socius*, the social person, on the other[4]. In order to live and survive, a person had to and must be a *homo faber*, who manipulates and controls the external, material objects of nature. As a social animal, he/she had to develop his/her respective social instincts and inclinations of spirit. These two aspects of human nature and intelligence are manifested sometimes in his/her technical preoccupations and activities, sometimes in his/her social and speculative activities and preoccupations.

"*Between these two tendencies, the geometric-mechanical comprehension of the external world, and a speculative conception of this world that is formed in us when we become aware of it through the lens of social categories, there is no harmony or rational correspondence; rather there is a discord and almost an antinomy. It is said that when a person thinks (meditates) on his/her nature and conditions, he/she thinks with the brain of another age, and although h/she possesses the technical knowledge of the adult, he/she still philosophizes as a child*[5]."

In any society and culture, there are always these two different supersystems, each unifying a large number of subsystems. The technical supersystem includes technology, practical and applied sciences, economic processes of production and modification of material things, practical inventions, practical language, and other sectors of agriculture. Speculative and reflective systems consist of religion, magic, ethics, law, the arts, philosophy, and the theoretical sciences. At one point one of these supersystems predominates in a given society (reflective or speculative in the Middle Ages, for example), in another its rival (technical, in the modern era). Each of them, when it dominates, imprints its culture, with its specific note.

Of these, *the homo faber* technical system (and the corresponding thinking and activities) emerged earlier than the speculative, reflecti-

[2] Check A.Coste, *L'experience des peuples et les previsions qu'elle autorise* (Paris, 1900) unit I, II și *Les principes d'une sociologie objective* (Paris, 1899) unit II, III, IV, XXII.

[3] See A.G. Keller, *Societal Evolution* (New York, 1931) pp. 208, 218, 225-226, 246-250. Kroeber's theory of *reality* and *value culture* is a variant of dichotomous theories. See A. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (pp. 152-166). Another variant of these theories is given by R. Merton in *Civilization and Culture*, *Sociology and Social Research*, XXI (1936), 105-113.

[4] Louis Weber, The Rhythm of Progress (Paris, 1913). See also Civilization et tehnique in Civilization: Le mot et l'idee (Paris 1930), pp.131-143.

[5] Louis Weber, *Le rythme du progres* (Paris, 1913), pg. XI-XIII.

ve, or social system. Changes in these systems and in all elements of each system take place in different ways.

The technical supersystem changes gradually, continuously and cumulatively. The change in the reflective supersystem is sporadic and non-cumulative. Because progress or technical change is cumulative and continuous, it influences the change of the speculative system in the total culture much more than the last over the first.

This is the essential framework of this theory. Not much different is the theory offered by A. Weber, R. Macver and T. Veblen. Alfred Weber rightly points out, that if sociology does not want to be sterile and pedantic, it must deal not only and not so much with the pure study of forms and the description of petty facts (however precise), but with the central problems of life and it should try to understand the historical processes, their meanings, and the way and cause, in their entirety[6].

In pursuit of this goal, he considers that the total sociocultural world of a given society or area (social system) and the total change in it (Gesellschaftsprozess) consists of two different systems - civilization and culture - and two different processes - the process of civilization (*Zivilizationsprozess*) and cultural change (*Kultur bewegung*). Through civilization, A. Weber means something similar to *the mechanical arts* of F. Bacon, with *the mechanical system* of L. Weber and, in a generic form (though not in the concrete content), with *the social category* of Coste. It is a world of scientific, technological, economic, material, utilitarian, sociocultural phenomena. By culture, it means reflective, spiritual, non-utilitarian values and phenomena - religious, philosophical, artistic and similar[7].

Total sociocultural change (*Gesellschoftsprozess*) is made up of these two main processes, *Zivilizationsprozess* and *Kulturbewegung*. The mode of change of each of these processes is different: *Zivilizationsprozess* is universal, always spreading in ever-widening sections of humanity, regularly, cumulatively, linearly in its expansion and perfection; it is a line of progress. *Kulturbewegung* is irregular, non-cumulative, without any linear direction, linked to a certain area of historical culture or society, beyond which it does not spread, despite cultural contact; it is not transferable to other cultures.

From these brief descriptions, we can easily recognize the essential resemblance of the schemes of Coste, Louis Weber, and Alfred Weber.

Very similar in the essential points is the scheme of R. MacIver. He attributes the inadequacy of the current haphazard description of historical change to the inability of scientists to recognize the fundamental unity of the phenomena they describe. Without a real unity, no real change takes place, because any real change presupposes continuity, and continuity exists only in a certain unity. He rightly remarks, “*Without this concept of unity, historical correction cuts only separate paths through the jungle of events*[8].” In short, he clearly understands the need to distinguish between a system unit and a conglomerate unit. Because conglomerates are infinite in number, no simple description of change or modification in conglomerates allows us to properly understand the nature and cause of general patterns of change. Hence MacIver’s search for major systems or units in the jungle of sociocultural phenomena. Its solution is reduced to the recognition in the total sociocultural world of two distinct classes or fundamental systems, namely, the system of civilization and the system of culture. The first is made up of

[6] Alfred Weber, *Ideen zur Staats- und Kultursoziologie* (Karlsruhe, 1927), pg.5-6. His last work, *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie* (Leyden, 1935), does not go far beyond the theory set out in the *Ideen*.

[7] A.Weber, *Ideen*, pg. 2.

[8] AR.MacIver, *The Historical Pattern of Social Change, in Journal of Social Philosophy*, October, 1936, pg.36.

non-utilitarian sociocultural elements that serve as means rather than as ends or values in themselves; these are the technological, scientific, economic and political systems. The culture system is composed of socio-cultural elements that are *values-goals*: "*Family, church, club, discussion group, circle of friends, sports organization, art and science association, alumni association, and certain forms of institutions educational, are typical embodiments of values-as-goals*[9].". The patterns of change in each of these systems are different: civilization or technological change is gradual, cumulative, linear, and progressive in the line of ever-improving means of civilization. Cultural change is intermittent, non-cumulative, nonlinear, progressing in undulating lines or in *cycles and rhythms*.

Civilization - the latest and most perfect cars, cars and planes - is universal by nature; it spreads to all peoples, with their different cultures. Culture, on the other hand, is something more intimate; it can only belong to a certain group. It has no universality; it does not penetrate beyond a certain group; it does not broadcast *urbi et orbi* and is restricted to a limited social area[10].

Both of these systems coexist in any society and influence each other. But because the progress of the civilizational system is incessant, cumulative, and unhindered, the technological system seems to condition the cultural system far more than the other way around[11].

The theories of W. Ogburn and F.S. Chopin are built on the same lines. According to Ogburn, sociocultural phenomena fall into two main classes: material culture and immaterial culture. Material culture is not clearly defined by the author[12]. From the context of his writings, it is obvious that material culture encompasses technological inventions, economic phenomena, and several other classes of sociocultural phenomena. Nonmaterial culture consists of immaterial sociocultural phenomena, such as art, philosophy, religion, partially social, political, and other forms of organization, and other sectors of the sociocultural world.

Ogburn's two culture systems are different, and so they are changing in different ways. Material culture changes in a linear direction, of a selective accumulation; over time, it develops progressively and becomes more perfect; its change is continuous (though not with the same speed and tempo); the tempo of change is faster than in immaterial culture. In the process of change, material culture usually takes precedence, while immaterial culture lags behind. This means that material culture is stronger than immaterial culture - again a thesis shared by almost all previous theories. Intangible culture changes sporadically; it is neither cumulative nor universal.

Finally, a number of other theories, such as those of Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen[13], clearly emphasize the economic or technological

[9] See MacIver, Society (New York, 1937), chap. XII. These criteria have been used by many economists to separate economic activities from others. *"Economic activity is characterized by two specific features: objective - nature and not man is its immediate object; subjective - economic activity is always a means, not an end in itself"* in M.I. Tugan-Baranovsky, Foundations of Political Economy (6th ed., Riga, 1924) pg.9.

[10] In his work *Social Causation* (New York, 1942), MacIver changes his theory somewhat, *dividing the conscious form of total existence* into social, technological, and cultural systems, indicating roughly the major sectors of each system. However, the essential principles of the previous version of his theory are maintained in this latest version.

[11] In this respect, an ambiguity floats along both of MacIver's works. On the other hand, it strongly emphasizes the reciprocity of influence, and even the fact that the course of technology or civilization is controlled by culture, which determines what is used. See Society, pp. 462-464 and 470-473. This ambiguity, inevitable in such a setting, is present throughout MacIver's theory.

[12] In *Social Change* (New York, 1922), he introduces the term without any definition or specification; pg.60. See also *Recent Social Trends in the United* States (New York, 1933), p. XIII, where the whole theory is exposed again. The specific definitions given do not rule out vagueness.

[13] See K. Marx, A *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (New York, 1904), pp. 11-13. For an exposition and analysis of Marxist sociology see G. Gurwitch, *Dialectique et sociologie* (Paris, 1962) chap. VIII; T. Veblen, The Institute of Workmanship (New York, 1914); *The Theory of The Seizure Class* (New York 1899); *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization* (New York, 1919) and *The Higher Lerning in America* (New York, 1918).

system of the total sociocultural world (*Marx's material power* and *material forces of production* and *Veblen's technological system*), but do not group the rest of the sociocultural traits in a defined system. They are left as a kind of residual category, in which such subsystems as Marx's *legal* and *political superstructure* and *ideology* are sometimes distinguished; but this is done *en passant*, so to speak. Another difference is that Marx and Veblen's theories implicitly assume that the whole sociocultural world is obviously integrated around their *economic-technological* system, in an integral system and, therefore, when the axis changes, the rest of the sectors of the sociocultural world change. But this difference - important at first sight - is not so important in reality because, after all, L. Weber, Ogburn and MacIver also claim that the technical-material system is constantly changing and is irresistible in its effects on the on the non-material cultural system, which means, in fact, that both of their systems are somewhat integrated into a causal system, dominated by the civilizational or material system. Marx's theory is, in fact, a prototype of all the other theories examined.

The main flaw of these theories is that none go beyond more or less general statements about the nature of the sociocultural system or unit. Is the system made up of causally united elements, or of logically united elements, or is it just a formal concept-category, a simple sum of similar conglomerates? If so, how does it differ from conglomerates? None of the authors, except MacIver, even try to define their system. Even less do we know whether a certain class of social phenomena, for example art or religion, in *all* its forms, always belongs to one of the two systems, or whether it belongs to it only in a certain form. For example, when art is visual or sensitive, or when religion is *scientific*, they belong to a class; they belong to the other system when art is ideational or when religion is supranational. Theories are really foggy.

To the extent that it is necessary to determine whether they mean something precise, it is found that the dichotomous divisions of these theories are fictitious, logically deficient, and factually erroneous. Let's look, from this perspective, one variant after another:

Material *versus* non-material culture

What is material culture? In one place we are told that the materiality of the *culture trait* "*lies not in the life (or physical properties) of a particular object, but in the perpetuation of the* ***knowledge*** *of being the object."*[14] Furthermore, we are always told that material culture *develops through inventions, through inventions, or through mental capacity*[15]. This means that material culture itself is a form of knowledge, because invention or mental capacity is neither a physical-chemical process as such nor a biological process as such (many organisms do not invent), but a mental process or idea. As such, it must be placed by Ogburn with immaterial culture, because science is considered by him as a form of immaterial culture. We thus have two statements: *knowledge is material culture* and *knowledge (science) is immaterial culture.*

As R. Merton rightly remarks: "The same cultural trait is sometimes classified (by Ogburn) as material, sometimes as immaterial. For example, the use of objects and substances is a part of material culture (*Social Change, 72*), while the ways of doing things and the rules involved in the handling of technical procedures are immaterial (*Ibid*, 28, 44, 271). Again, the methods of making objects are both material and immaterial (*Ibid*, 12, 105, 106), and so on.[16]"

All this means that the fundamental premise of Ogburn's theory is poorly defined, even contradictory in itself; precisely because of

[14] Obburn, *Social Change*, pg.74.
[15] *Ibid*, pg. 36, 103, 269 și urm.
[16] See R. K. Merton, Civilization and Culture in Sociology and Social Research, XXI (1936), 104.

this it cannot serve as a basis for subsequent theses based on it.

The same is true of Marxist theory and similar theories of *economic interpretation of history*. *Their means and instruments of production, the material force of production, the relations of production and the economic structure (or system) of society as* the real basis on which the legal and political superstructures (and other ideological superstructures) are based, are poorly defined. These theories completely neglect the fundamental fact of the composite and derived nature of any economic system, as clearly determined by scientifically valid knowledge and technology, and the nature of the prevailing ethical and legal norms in society, as well as the obvious influence of religious, philosophical, political factors, and even aesthetics. In its phases of production, distribution and even consumption, the economic system of a social group incorporates scientific (including technological) knowledge and the legal and moral norms prevailing in it. The Bronze Age economy was only as advanced as its knowledge, technology, and legal norms. Before the knowledge of the properties of fire, wind, wheel, or later steam, electricity, and atomic fission, and before the invention of tools for the use of these energies, the economy of the Stone Age, Copper, Bronze or Machine could not be established: the knowledge used has determined the kind of economy of each society in the past and determines it today. Also, the kind of legal norms prevailing in a given society precisely determines the main forms of economic relations in it - whether there will be communal or private property and what legal ways to acquire, use, administer, exchange and dispose of economic goods, there will be. This derivative nature of the economic system can be expressed by the equation:

$$SE = f (ST + LE)$$

(The economic system of any society is a function of its science and technology, plus its laws and ethics). Less important, but still significant, is the conditioning role of the religious, philosophical, political and aesthetic values and norms of society. A considerable power of the economic forces is due to the power of the scientific-technological and ethical-legal forces that the economic system incorporates. With the change in its scientific-technical knowledge and in the ethical-legal norms, the economic system of the society undergoes a corresponding change[17].

This compound-derived nature of the economic system does not mean that it should be seen as a kind of *prime mover* (initial cause of movement) in sociocultural change, or as *a real basis* for non-economic superstructure, as Marxist theory holds. If we subtracted its scientific-technological and ethical-legal components from any economic system, there would be nothing left, just as if we extracted hydrogen and oxygen from water, there would be nothing left.

The second fundamental error of both Marxist and Ogburnian theories is the consideration of material and immaterial as two separate entities or different classes of phenomena. It is a mistake because, as we have seen, any object, feature or element of culture always has two aspects: its internal, sociocultural significance, which is its immaterial aspect, and its external or material aspect, which consists of vehicles and agents composed of inorganic and organic phenomena, which embody, objectify, externalize or socialize the internal aspect or sociocultural significance. Deprived of their internal significance, a tool, a knife, an ax, a car, a fishing tackle, a radio and a national flag all cease to be objects of culture and become purely physical, chemical or biological objects. A scientific idea, when it becomes social and penetrates, from the mind of

[17] See a development of this thesis in R. Stammler, *Wirtschoft und Recht nach der materialist Geschichtsfassung* (Leipzig, 1896) and in L. Petrazycki, *Die Lehre vom Einkomenn* (Leipzig, 1893).

the person who conceived it, in social life, is always objectified in some *material* vehicles: in a speech (sound, air waves), in a book, in a tape recorder, in a film, manuscript, instrument, apparatus, laboratory, scientific reading, meeting, class, university, academy, institute, and in hundreds of other forms, perfectly material. A technical idea is externalized in the form of the invented machine or tools, and in the material possessions of the corporation exploiting the invention. Similarly, a religious belief, becoming sociocultural (i.e. accessible to others) is inevitably externalized in the vehicles of preaching, confession, manuscript, book, print media, music, ceremonies, religious statues, paintings, icons, in the construction of chapels, temples, cathedrals, and in the formation of religious organizations, with all their material properties and complexes. An aesthetic idea, becoming social, is embodied in paintings, statues, ornaments, constructions, musical scores and instruments, conservatories, performance halls, concert studios, museums and in many other forms, perfectly material.

The volumes of codes of laws and statutes, the police, the judges, the courts, the prisons, the electric seats, and other material instruments of punishment, are *the material* vehicles of legal and ethical ideas and values.

The same is true of political, economic or social ideas, values and norms. Each of them, if conceived by an individual, cannot become social - that is, accessible to others - without some form of externalization or materialization, because (excluding telepathy and clairvoyance) we cannot convey to anyone something of our inner experience - ideas, feelings, emotions, wills - without externalizing it. Externalization means materialization. It requires vehicles and physical agents. We know that any empirical sociocultural system has *the material* components of vehicles and agents. On the other hand, no object or phenomenon, whatever its physical or chemical properties, can become an object or phenomenon of culture without having the internal aspect of meanings. When this axiom is understood, all the absurdity of the contrast between material culture (vehicles) and immaterial culture (meanings) as separate entities and classes or objects becomes separate.

Technological versus socio-reflective culture

Is the dichotomy of Louis Weber and partly of Marx and Veblen better than the dichotomy of material and immaterial? No, and for similar reasons. These theories like to start with the old maxim *Primum vivere*, *deinde philosophare*, or as Goethe said, “*In the beginning was action*[18]” and as W.G.Sumner said, “*The first task of life is to live; people start with deeds, not thoughts* ”.[19] These theories claim that the person was first *homo faber*, not *homo socius* or *homo sapiens* thinker, and that action, practice, ways of doing things or techniques, preceded and precede any thought and are special phenomena of thought. Hence, the separation of technique, or technical class from sociocultural phenomena, from the non-technical class. Is this logically valid? No, it is not. First of all, there is no evidence of factual or logical evidence that *homo faber* preceded *homo sapiens* or *homo socius*. Logically, in order to be even the most primitive *homo faber*, the person must be, to a certain extent, a thinker - in a primitive way - *homo sapiens*; otherwise, he/she could not do or make anything (because he/she is not considered to be driven by instinct. If he/she were driven by instinct, then he/she would be just an animal, an organism of biology and not a carrier of culture). It took a lot of thinking on his/her part to make it the simplest stone weapon to throw at an animal, not to mention the more complex operations.

[18] See L. Weber, *La rythme du progres*, page 123.

[19] W.G.Sumner, *Folkways* (New York, 1906) pp. 1, 2, 25 ff .; and A. Keller, *Societal Evolution* (New York 1931) pg.208.

Leaving aside the priority of the emergence of *homo faber* and turning our attention to current and known human behavior, we can say with certainty that people do not always start with actions: in all their rational or semi-rational behavior, in all their conscious actions, whether they think before they act or they think simultaneously with the action. The proportion of these rational, semi-rational, conscious, premeditated actions is enormous in total human behavior.

In his/her claim to universality, the pragmatic argument discussed is obviously erroneous. He/she elevates a partial category to the rank of universal rule. Blind and unthinking action is not enough to become a real force for socio-cultural change, to be cumulative, and to influence by growing all other sectors of socio-cultural phenomena. A blind and erroneous action leads only to the loss of the actors, and not to the accumulation of culture, experience and knowledge. If the unthinking action, as an instinct, happens to be adequate, to fulfill a need, the result will be a development of the instinct, a stagnation of the instinctively correct answers, and the eventual stagnation of the whole sociocultural life. The result will not be an ever-changing culture, and no social technique other than the instinctive technique of animals. In short, the argument destroys itself through internal contradictions, and can be left there to rest in peace.

The dichotomous classification of sociocultural phenomena into technical (or technological) and non-technical (non-technological) phenomena is absolutely debatable. Any class of sociocultural phenomena, including the class of supposedly non-technical phenomena, has its technical and non-technical aspects, just as any class of sociocultural phenomena has its *material* vehicles and its *immaterial* meanings and aspects. Technique means how to do things, how to use tools and implements, and how to consciously and unconsciously achieve certain goals. Painting, sculpture, architecture, music, literature, drama, religion, science, law, ethics, economic, political and social organizations have their own technique and cannot but have it. In short, any class of sociocultural phenomena has its own technique, reaching the technology of *technology*. Every scientific system, be it physics or chemistry, history or biology, has its own technique of research, study, training, conservation and propagation. In most cases it is a very complex, difficult and complicated technique, which requires years of training. At the same time, science in general and the social sciences in particular are, according to the criticized theory, supposedly non-technical or non-technological phenomena. Every religion has a vast technical element: the techniques of its prayers, rituals, processions, its influence and its propagation. It also has a huge number of vehicles, tools, *material* tools and a very rigid and complex code of rules and hieratic rules, of technical procedure, to achieve its goals. And religion is supposed to be a non-technical phenomenon! Every art, be it music, painting, architecture, theater, literature, has its own technique. Each artist often has their own special method of creation, and it takes years and years of training to master even a small part of this technique. And it is claimed that art is also a non-technical phenomenon.

Contrasting technical phenomena with non-technical ones, as separate classes, is not much more justified than contrasting the face with the bridge of the palm, or one side of the garment with the other (the vehicle that aims with meaning). To say that one side of a garment progresses, that the other lags behind, or that one face appears earlier than the other, is also absurd. Put in such a form, the theory is, of course, wrong. It can be put, however, in a different form, namely that certain classes of sociocultural phenomena (with their technical and non-technical aspects) are united in

one system - for example, an economic and technological system - while other classes of sociocultural phenomena - for example, art, religion, science, ethics and law - are united in another system, and these systems change differently. This brings us to the third society of dichotomous theories: civilization *versus* culture.

Civilization versus culture. Society versus ideology

We are faced with an extremely vague character in terms of what is meant by each class and what *forces* - elements, components, subsystems - of sociocultural phenomena, each class is made up of. A. Weber does not give any clear *fundamentum divisionis*. A.Coste, M.Ingam-Baranovsky and R.MacIver say that it is *the principle of utility* or that of *values-as-means* and *as purposes*. Is the principle valid? Does it serve as a competent guide to distinguish which one? We're afraid not. First, because each of these authors puts the same category of phenomena sometimes in one, sometimes in the other of their dichotomous classes. For example, Coste puts his beliefs and religion in his class from time to time. So does MacIver. Science is put by him sometimes in civilization[20], sometimes in culture[21].

Then, according to the same utilitarian principle, Coste puts beliefs in the class of sociality (corresponding to MacIver's civilization); MacIver and A. Weber generally put religion in the class of culture, or what Coste calls ideology. Thus, although guided by the same principle, the authors use very different methods to *compartmentalize* sociocultural phenomena. Such inconsistencies and contradictions are numerous throughout their work. This shortcoming is not surprising, given the nature of their criteria. The principle of utility or use, by its very nature, cannot satisfactorily serve the purpose. If you are psychologically *unstable*, or what each person thinks is useful or not, we are stuck in a maze of oddities, differences and individual contradictions. Psychologically, an atheist considers religious functions absolutely useless; a believer, on the contrary, considers them the most useful and vital, even useful in his/her business.

Psychologically, Coste and MacIver consider the whole of theoretical science (natural, social, and humanistic)[22] and all the arts as useless or as *values-as-purposes*. There are thousands of people, scientists, artists, ordinary people who, psychologically, disagree with such a diagnosis; in their opinion, science and the arts are extremely useful, in the narrowest sense of the term. Coste, Weber, and MacIver consider technology useful and place it in the class of sociality or civilization, but there are many writers, philosophers, and ordinary people who deplore technical progress, find it harmful and poisonous, and believe that it deprives culture of beauty and health, undermines the true vigour and vital force of mankind, [23]etc.

Psychologically, there is no uniformity or assessment that determines which sociocultural phenomena are useful and which are not, which are *values-as-means* and which are *values-as-purposes*.

[20] See MacIver, *Society*, Farrar & Rinehart Inc., New York, 1937, pp.403-404.

[21] MacIver, *The Historical Pattern of Social Change*, Routledge, 1969, p.41

[22] MacIver sees the association of the arts and sciences as "the typical embodiment of values-as-goals". See "The Historical Pattern of Social Change" pg.41.

[23] See, for example, the views of Tolstoy, Ghandi, Ruskin, and Inge on him; or works such as those of G. Sombroso, *La rancon du machinisme* (The Price of Machinism) (Paris, 1931); RA Freeman, *Social Decay and Regeneration* (Boston, 1921); H.Adams, *The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma* (New York, 1919), J.L. Duplan, *La Majeste la machine* (Paris, 1930); D.Rops *Le monde sans ame* (*The world without a soul*) (Paris, 1932); H. Dubreuil, *Standards* (Paris, 1929); H.de Man, *An de la du Marxisme (Beyond Marxism*) (Paris, 1929); G. Duhamenl, *L'Umaniste et l'automate* (Paris, 1933); H. Bergson, *Le deux sources de la morale et de la religion* (Paris, 1932); O.Spengler, *Der Meurch und die Technik* (Munich, 1933); A.J.Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol.III pp. 154-174; vol.IV pg ,. 39-56; L.Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York, 1935) and *The Culture of the Cities* and P.M. Schull, *Machinisme et philosophie* (Paris, 1938).

That these statements are not mere assumptions is proved by a current study of the relationships between the manifest activities of individuals and groups and the motivation of these activities. A study on the actual motivation of 55 manifest activities of 103 people showed, first, that there is no close and specific relationship between a certain manifest activity and a certain motive, also considering whether the activity is considered as a means or as a purpose. Here are examples of the main reasons for the various activities: religious activity has as reasons (for different people and the same individual at different times): physical need, personal peace, tradition, custom, utilitarian and economic reasons, coercion, force of circumstance, curiosity, change, and so on. Dance is motivated by personal, social entertainment, habit, training, exercise, etc. The food is motivated by physical need, tradition, animosity, strength of circumstance and so on. These answers present a much more complex picture of motivation and its changing character than is usually presented. They also show that the same activity, even eating, seems to be sometimes a simple mean, sometimes a purpose in itself. For some, religious activity is a *value-goal*, for others a *value-means*. Even for the same individual it is sometimes the means, sometimes the goal[24].

There is no way to maintain the dichotomy criticized on a psychological basis. MacIver understands this, so he tries to move the problem from the subjective-psychological to the objective-sociological. He claims that such a dichotomy, with the compartments of culture mentioned in each dichotomous class, is sociologically given as an objective, supra-individual social reality.

Is the claim valid? We seriously question it, given that the author himself places science, for example, sometimes in one, sometimes in other groups. One may also wonder whether family, church, club, focus group, circle of friends, sports organization, arts and science associations, graduate associations, and certain forms of educational institutions are typical embodiments of *values-as-goals*, while technological, economic and political systems are typical *values-as-means*. We know that for most ordinary people and for some thinkers, from the sophists, Lextus Empiricus, Lucian, Marseilles of Padua, Machiavelli, Pierre du Bois, to a legion of skeptics, liberals and radicals, the only justification for religion and the church is that they are socially useful: they are good means for certain purposes. We know many people who marry (especially with a wealthy partner) and conceive of a family as a mere means for purposes completely foreign to the family. A large number of people view exercise and sports as a nuisance, but as a means of maintaining good health. On the other hand, for many technological inventors, and probably for most great inventors, the invention itself was the goal. Value in itself, not a means for something else.[25]

In terms of political systems, it would mean that we do not trust Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and a lot of great authors about the state and government, who considered the state and government as a *value-goal*, as a condition and at the same time the highest values, much higher and much more than *value-purpose,* than MacIver's conversation, sports, graduate and similar associations.

These facts cannot be questioned, but it can be argued that they present the situation from a psychological point of view, rather than a sociological one. If so, we may be wondering what

[24] See detailed data in P. Sorokin and C. Berger, *Time-Budgets of Human Behavior* (Harvard Sociological Studies, 1939) part III.

[25] See F. Tanssing*, Inventors and Money-Makers* (New York, 1915), where the real psychology of inventors and their passion for their work is excellently documented. J.Rossman, *The Psychology of the Inventor* (Washington, 1931) chap.X. Of the 710 inventors asked about the reasons for their invention, 193 indicated a love for the invention; 167, financial gain; 118 needs; 73 desire to reach; 27 prestige; 22 altruisms; 6 laziness and so on.

is wrong with MacIver's alleged sociological evidence. Unfortunately, he does not provide any evidence. The only way left for him is to show that an objective investigation of the classes listed by sociocultural phenomena proves that technological, economic, and political activities are always and everywhere utilitarian, while family, religion, arts, science, and philosophy are uniformly and perennially devoid of utilitarian character. It is hardly possible to prove such an assertion. First, if the so-called useless or non-utilitarian classes of sociocultural phenomena were like this, how would they have survived throughout all the great epochs of human history? Secondly, there are enough studies of even the most primitive religion and magic to prove their exceptional utility in various ways: Plato, Aristotle, Ibu-Khaldun, Vico, St. Thomas Aquinas, and other idealistic thinkers, as well as investigators, sceptics or scientists such as Marseilles of Padua, Machiavelli, E. Durkheim, J. Frazer, G. LeBen, B. Kidd, G. Sorel, V. Pareto, C. Illwood, Max Weber and F. de Coulanges have unquestionably demonstrated the functions utilities of religion[26]. The same can be said, with a slight change, about the arts and especially about science, ethics, law and any kind of cultural phenomena. And vice versa, not every form of technological, economic or political activity has always been useful everywhere. If that were the case, there would never have been a bad economy, no harmful politics, no harmful technology[27].

From the point of view of ideational ethics, all sensible utilities lead only to perdition; union with the Absolute and all that leads to it are the only real value. From the point of view of sensitive ethics, ethics and ideational values are nothing but superstition and obscurantism. In short, any objective examination will show that, sociologically, there are no classes of useful or useless sociocultural phenomena as such, or *values-means* and *values-goals* as such. Even less is it an objective sociological fact that economic, political, technological, and other classes are sociological *means*, while the circle of friends and the sports organization are *goals*.

Sociologically, there is no class of sociocultural objects that for all people, at all times, in all cultures, is always *value-purpose* or *value-means*. Even within the same culture, say sensitive, any of its main systems divides (sociologically) its own values into *values-purposes* and *values-means*, into positive and negative, leading to a pyramid of values. Religion has its value as a goal: God, union with him, salvation of the soul. It also has its *middle values*: obedience, godly living, donations to church and the poor, regular church attendance, church building, and so on. Likewise, science has its *value-purpose*: true and real knowledge, and its *middle values*: obtaining a good endowment for a university, good laboratories, libraries, tools and study techniques. Art has *its purpose value*: beauty, and *its middle values*: brushes, canvases, piano, etc. *The goal value* of the business is to achieve a successful enterprise, also on the line of social service; *its values-means* are advertising, sellers, organizers, workers, successful competition, etc. So, it is with politics and government.

In each class of sociocultural phenomena, not all its values are considered equal, but stratified in a hierarchical pyramid, starting with the negative and mediocre *means-values* and ending with the final, supreme *goal-value*. There is hardly any important sector of culture and society that considers all its values to be equal, either as mere means or as mere purposes, or to put them all on the same level.

[26] See especially works such as J.G. Frazer, *Psyche's Task* (London, 1913) and G. Sorel, *Reflection on Violence* (New York, 1912), p. 133, where he proves the usefulness of mythology.

[27] Toynbee clearly demonstrates that technological progress, if any, has been associated with a decline of civilization, not with its development and improvement. See *A Study of History*, vol.III, p.154; vol.IV, pp. 39-56.

This is the real sociological situation, not the imaginary one, assumed by the mentioned authors. These authors have no real basis on which to claim that their dichotomy is solidly grounded. The dichotomous division of the total sociocultural world into two different supersystems is erroneous. Therefore, it is no less erroneous to try to give each of these divisions a number of special features.

We have seen that all dichotomists claim a number of differences in the functions and mode of change of each of their two systems. They assure us that the technological, societal, material, civilizational system changes regularly, is cumulative, is linear in *its progressive growth and improvement* (*its progressive: biggernes and betterness),* spreads earlier, more easily, in all cultures, and takes it forward in the process of change; and that the other system, ideological, immaterial, cultural, is neither cumulative, nor linear in its development, nor universal in its diffusion; it is locally limited to a whole society or area, and lags behind in the process of change.

Are these statements valid? Logically, if the dichotomies are debatable, we should expect these conclusions to be questionable. In fact, they are also inappropriate. The claim that civilization or sociality, respectively material culture has a universal character, spreads more easily in all kinds of societies and cultures, and is adopted and accepted by all, while immaterial culture remains, and is destined to remain, a pure local phenomenon, unable to spread in different cultures, is also highly questionable. Indeed, since the end of the 19th century, a lot of new technological inventions have spread all over the planet: automobiles, airplanes, radios, and so on. But since World War I, such *masses* of intangible culture as communism, fascism, totalitarianism, jazz music, and certain forms of dance have also spread throughout the planet; and if we measure the spread and universality of diffusion, by the number of individuals and groups who have accepted them and who use the material and immaterial complexes mentioned, it is likely that fascism, communism and totalitarianism have spread more widely and in a shorter period than the car or the plane. In other words, the supposedly universal cultural traits are at least as universal as the supposedly universal civilizational traits. The Bible is obviously immaterial culture; and yet there is hardly any technological invention that can be broadcast *urbi et orbi* as much as the Bible. So are the works of Shakespeare and Beethoven; like the Confucian and Platonic philosophies; like using lipstick and hairstyle; as the monarchy and the republic; like socialism and progressivism; as monogamous and polygamous family life; as the style of fashion, art and parliamentarism; like evening wear and theosophy. The spread of Mohammedanism is another example of the widespread of intangible culture in the past. Dissemination of the Syrian alphabet from Syria to the Mongols and Manchurians in Asia; of Hellenic art forms from the Greco-Roman world to the Hindu world; the dissemination, adaptation, or independent invention of very similar moral codes to an enormous number of primitive and historical societies of the past and present[28]; the presence of an enormous number of similar political institutions, similar forms of marriage and family life, religious beliefs, forms of social organization, morals and manners, in a large number of societies of the past and present; often separated from each

[28] In relation to members of the same society, the main moral perceptions and the main crimes are similar, almost identical, in the codes of Judaism, Hinduism, buddhism, christianity, confussm, taoism, mahomedanism and almost all historical and primitive societies. As for the crime, see *Dynamics*, Vol. II, Chapter.15, especially pg. 576. See also the imilarity of moral codes, *Ibid*, Chapter 113 and 114. See also L.Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (London, 1923) and E.Westermark, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas* (2 vol., London, 1906).

other by vast areas[29] - all these examples of the spread or independent invention of similar values of intangible culture, in hundreds and thousands of different tribes, societies and nations, are eloquent proof of the ability of intangible values to spread or spread root in the most diverse cultures and peoples. This fact alone makes the claims of dichotomous theories entirely invalid.

On the other hand, a lot of purely technical inventions do not spread beyond the society that invents them and needs them. Polynesians and Eskimos have invented ingenious methods of navigation, perfectly adapted to their conditions. Societies in a mountainous region did not adopt them and remained untouched by them. The Assyrians and Spartans invented (or adopted) an excellent technique of military organization. Many companies that did not need such a technique did not take an interest in it and did not adopt it. The technique of heating buildings with electricity, oil or gas, or building houses capable of retaining heat, has not spread to tropical and subtropical regions. Fishing techniques have not been adopted by societies living in regions without rivers or lakes, or fish waters. Material values in no way monopolize the privilege of being more necessary than intangible values. The facts are contrary to the theory that *all* material values are needed by *all* societies, while *all* intangible values are not needed by any other society except the society that created them. The real situation is that between both kinds of *tangible and intangible values* there are some that are needed by a large number of societies, so they are widely adopted (or created independently in different societies); and there are material and intangible values that meet only the local need of a given society, or of a few particular societies. As such, they remain *parochial* values and do not spread to different societies and areas.

The defenders of the criticized theories say that while non-material culture can spread as widely and quickly as material, its dissemination is much less real. Communism and Christianity of the Russians, the Chinese, the blacks, the Hindus, the Abisinians, the French and Americans are similar only by name, they show; by their real character, these ideologies represent something very different for each of these groups. True. But the same is true of the dissemination of material objects. Why? Because the character (or system), whether is material or immaterial, when it is disseminated from one group to another, undergoes a transformation in its use, meaning, value and character (when the groups are distinguished by their culture). The greater the difference, the greater the change that the character must suffer.[30] Only by changing between similar groups can the conglomerates or migration systems be maintained, without any change in their qualities, functions, use, etc. A car seems to be the same in New York as in an African wilderness. The most superfluous text, howe-

[29] For example, a cultural feature such as the *hereditary government* is located at 90 different primitive societies in the sample of Hobhouse-Wheler-Ginsberg; as *personal government*, at 80 societies; as a *matrix descendant* at 75; as a *patryl descendant* at 84 different tribes and societies; like *the killing of defeated prisoners* on 105 and so on. See L.T. Hobhouse, G. C.Wheeler and M. Grizberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London, 1915). See many cases of similarity in the non-material features of the cultures of different peoples and societies in J. Mazzarella, *Les types sociaux et le droi*t (Paris, 1908) and in its volumes of *Studi ethnologia guiridica* (Catania, 1903). Examples of such widespread dissemination or invention of similar cultural systems or features are found in almost every competent text of cultural anthropology, ethnoology and sociology; they are also found in beliefs, myths, poetry; in the forms of family life and marriage; in the forms of political organization, war and peace; magic and rituals; forms of art and ceremony; ethical norms and morals; in almost every field of so-called immaterial culture. In view of this undeniable fact, we can only wonder that the dioctomist theorists are serious about their claim. See also M.Mauss, *Civilization: Elements et forms*, in: *Civilizations: Le mot et L'idee*, (Paris, 1910).

[30] It can be easily seen that the statement is a partial case of the general principle of the selectivity of a sociocultural system. If any system is selective, it accepts some and rejects other features. Those they accept must be changed if they are very heterogeneous in relation to the system; the greater the heterogeneity, the greater the change must be. When it is too large, the system does not ingest it at all.

ver, indicates that it is different: it acts differently (in some cases, forced to the maximum); it is used for different purposes; its values and meanings are different; its damage and repairs are different.

The dichotomous assertion of the advancement and lagging behind of material and immaterial cultures is also debatable. If the theory says that in the emergence or change of a cultural system its material and behavioural forms appear and change first, the theory is erroneous. Usually, the ideas, the concepts inside a system, including the technical invention, precede their material objectification and socialization. Similarly, a change in the meaning component of the system usually precedes the change in its other components.

If the theory means that the practical technical invention precedes in time the theoretical discoveries in the corresponding pure science, such as, for example, that physico-chemical technology precedes the development of mathematics, physics and chemistry, or that medicine and agronomy precede the discoveries and development of theoretical biology, then the theory is just as debatable.

Sometimes a technical inventor, in the process of his/her creation, discovers an essential theoretical principle, but even then, he/she can only be one of the many theoretical discoveries that had to be known before his/her invention was possible. Discoveries and inventions go hand in hand with their major transformations, albeit in minor fluctuations, when one, when the other seems to take precedence.

If theory is to say that in the life history of a given total culture, scientific, technological and economic discoveries appear, flourish and change first, while religious, artistic, socio-political, philosophical and ideological discoveries appear, they thrive and change later, the theory is again questionable, both logical and factual. In the years of history, people who have created important religious and political systems appeared many centuries before scientific, technological and economic discoveries, creators and inventors. This is true of all the countries studied.

If the theory is to say that natural-scientific disciplines and technologies occur, develop and change earlier than social, humanist, religious, artistic, philosophical, and ethical (in succession, mathematics and mathematical technology; astronomy, physics, chemistry and technologies; biology and its technologies) the theory is essentially similar to Comte's theory. Data on discoveries in natural sciences and humanities in Arabia, as well as in various natural sciences around the world, and data on creative historical personalities in specific fields, do not corroborate such a claim at all. Rather, they prove that the invention or creation of a new system in religion, politics, social science, humanities, philosophy, or the arts was produced either before or at the same time as the discoveries in the mathematics-physico-chemical and technological fields[31]. This is evidenced by paleolithic and Neolithic cuture data. In all primitive tribes, we meet not only relatives of physicochemical sciences and their technologies, but often more developed systems of religion and magic, arts[32], family and political organizations, and laws and morals.

In addition, until very recently, there were no clear divisions between science, philosophy, religion and technology. Almost all the eminent thinkers of Greece and Rome, and of medieval Europe, were at once scholars, philosophers, moralists, and political and social ideologues; many were also technical inven-

[31] See A.Kroeber, *Configurations of Culture Growth*, University of California press, 1947, pg.779. He does not find even a people in whose culture science comes first, followed by religion. The rule is that religion first reaches a high degree of integration, and then the science, the arts, etc. are developing.

[32] See especially F. Boas, *Primitive Art* (Oslo, 1927); H.Read, *Art and Society* (New York, 1937) and R.H.Lowie, *Primitive Religion (*New York, 1925).

tors, such as Thales of Miletus, Pythagoras, Architas, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Democritus[33]. Many others, such as Hesiod, Homer, Pythagoras, Thales, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Zena, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Nicholas Cusamus, Roger Bacon, and others, were simultaneously philosophers, theologians, men of science, social, political, legal and ethical thinkers, as well as artists. We cannot expect the scholar of these people to change faster and sooner than the philosopher, theologian, legislator, or political thinker. If it is assumed that each of these individual thinkers is logical, his total ideology must have changed more or less consistently in unity. On the other hand, if everyone is assumed to be illogical, the very fact of illogicality excludes the possibility of any uniform change, which would give constant priority to the change of his scientific and technical ideas.

As for the seemingly convincing argument that the speed of change in material culture is faster than in the immaterial one, the argument fails, failing to bring any unit of speed of change. Without such unity, comparing the magnitude or speed of change between material and immaterial phenomena becomes impossible. Which change is greater or faster: from paganism and Judaism to Christianity, or from horse-drawn carriage to automobile? From polygamy to monogamy, or from the pastoral economy to the agricultural economy? From classical to Gothic architecture, or from a *natural* economy to a money economy? From capitalism to communism or from steam to electricity? From gunpowder to atomic fission, or from sovereign nation states to a world state? Which of these changes covers the longest sociocultural distance in the shortest amount of time? Without a unit to measure, the question cannot be answered. The dichotomous argument becomes completely useless. No less useless is their argument that while the material culture of the last few decades has changed enormously, the immaterial culture has lagged behind and is now hopelessly obsolete. The argument is purely subjective and arbitrary in choosing the criteria. The sublime norms of ethical conduct, The Golden Rule, the ethical norms of almost all major religions, and especially the Sermon on the Mount rules, have been discovered and formulated in ethical or immaterial culture thousands of years ago. The behavioural and material realization of these norms has remained irreparably back to the present time. Science and technology have not yet objectified, through them or through total material culture, these immaterial discoveries. Likewise, even known *economic* and political systems were formulated by religious, ethical, political, and social thinkers long before, by thinkers such as Moses, Confucius, Lao-tzi, Hesiod, and Plato, to name a few. And yet the economy and the material and technological political regimes have not been able, until now, to realize these ideological systems. Some of the greatest aesthetic values in literature and painting, sculpture and architecture, music and drama, were developed long before in ancient Egypt and China, India and Greece, Rome and Persia. The material, technological and economic culture contemporary with these creations was, in comparison, infinitely more primitive, imperfect and inefficient; even today’s material culture cannot boast of any comparable perfection in its own field. These intangible creations have been waiting for thousands of years for proper realization in material culture, and are still waiting. The immaterial *utopias* of beautiful garden cities, of carpets and flying machines, even of intraatomic fission, dissolution and recreation, appea-

[33] See P.M.Schuhl, *Machinisme et philosophie*, (Paris, 1908), chap.I; A.Diels, *Antike Technik* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1924), pg.98 ff; L. Robin, *Plato* (Paris, 1935); F.M.Feldhaus *Die Technik der Antike und des Mittelalters* (Potsdam, 1931) and A.Rey, *La science dans l’antiquite* (2 vols. Paris, 1930-1933).

red thousands of years ago. In fact, on every side, the argument is just as wrong, because it makes the two fundamental assumptions false, discussed before; first, that the ideologies and material vehicles of cultural systems can be separated, and second, that all material components and all intangible components can be combined into two pseudo-supersystems. We have already seen that such a process ignores the true unity of cultural systems and admits, on the other hand, an entirely false unity of artificial, material and immaterial cultural clusters.

Equally meaningless is the assertion that while the material culture of the last century has changed enormously, our family, artistic, political, ethical, and religious cultures, have remained unchanged and outdated. First of all, it is not true to say that in the last century, decades or even years, our immaterial culture has not changed; it has changed enormously in all compartments. Second, even if it hadn't changed, what would be the reason for calling it outdated or obsolete? Suppose the family remained strong, truly family-oriented, free from divorce, with healthy and solid relationships and conditions, which ensures a good education of the children and minimizes juvenile delinquency. Is there a need for such an institution to change in order to avoid obsolescence? If it did, and change would take the form of a huge increase in divorces, separations, love scandals, and juvenile delinquency, then could it be said that it keeps up with material change and becomes *modern*? Is the music of Bach, Mozart and Beethoven obsolete? Does jazz and rock-and-roll represent a breakthrough in music, corresponding to a change in material culture? Is Shakespeare obsolete, and is only the latest bestseller representative of modern literature? It is pointless to talk about the enormous change in material culture and the obsolescence of immaterial culture. The fact that people like Beethoven and Shakespeare appeared centuries ago is proof of the leading (progressive) role of the immaterial arts, and not of their lagging behind in comparison with material culture.

In their great lamentation of the supposed lagging behind of immaterial culture, dichotomous theorists never stop to reflect on what kind of immaterial culture would correspond to each stage of material development. What kind of institution of family, music, philosophy, law, painting or sociology would be proper to *atomic material culture*? What kind of music should accompany atomic fission? What religion, if any? What ethics?

These questions have never been answered, because technology itself has never been able to replace the criteria for assessing the level of intangible culture. The criteria of obsolescence in music, religion, family, law, and philosophy must be drawn from music, religion, family, law, and philosophy. No other assessment can be meaningful, because in the absence of any appropriate standard, it degenerates into vague generalizations.

If the theories claim that the technology itself, which changes, always causes a change in the immaterial culture, the statement is again largely erroneous. We know of a large number of cases in which an existing technology has fallen not because of technology, but under the influence of intangible culture. Toynbee shows how the splendid Roman roads, the magnificent irrigation systems of the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys, Ceylon, were shattered not because of a decline in technical skills, but because of the emergence of social, political and moral anarchy among those peoples. We have witnessed the gigantic destruction of technological culture on the surface of this planet, in the wars and revolutions of this century[34]. Contemporary historians have discovered that the economic and technological decline of the Greco-Roman world was "not the cause, but

[34] See Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol.IV, p.40.

one aspect of the more general phenomenon of social disorganization.[35]” On the other hand, the development of modern technology, modern capitalism, and modern material culture did not occur earlier, but partly later, partly simultaneously with the development of the sensory arts and materialist and utilitarian philosophy, utilitarian and hedonistic ethics, and law, secularism, new forms of political and social thought, individualism, singularism, nominalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and many other intangible cultural systems[36].

The error of the theory of the unilateral efficiency of material culture can also be demonstrated by examining primitive societies, where it is discovered that there are different forms of intangible culture, in peoples with material cultures and similar technologies. On the other hand, religion, arts, literature, marriage customs, family organization, and similar political and legal institutions are found in populations with similar technological and material cultures.

Finally, it is false to claim that material culture is cumulative, while immaterial culture is not. This statement is again so ambiguous and vague that several possible meanings of it must be considered. If it literally means what it says, then it is obviously wrong; with the passage of time, the immaterial culture that accumulates in all its forms. Today, we have a much greater mass and diversity of musical compositions, literary works, sculptures, paintings, constructions, philosophies, religions, ethical systems, codes of laws, and social and political theories than we had with 100, 500, or 5,000 years before. If the statement is that only in science and technology do new discoveries actually produce new things or inventions, it is also wrong. Important religious, aesthetic or philosophical innovations are no less new. Confucianism, Taoism, Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism are all as new as any petty technical invention compared to their predecessors.

The same is true of important philosophical, literary, architectural, musical, or legal creations. In fact, novelty is neither absolute nor immaterial. *The new* technological invention, or scientific discovery, is generally a combination of old elements or a variation of an old principle. Even the fundamental principles of atomic structure, fission, and destruction were very old, dating from Democritus and Lencip, and from the even older thinkers of ancient India. The principles of structure, fission and atomic destruction are very precisely formulated in several ancient Hindu sources, which involve a cycle of elementary dissolution of all material elements - space, smell, colour, shape, fragrance, sound, ether and matter, with all their properties - occurring periodically at 311,040,000,000,000 years[37].

Creation in intangible cultures similarly involves the combination and variation of older systems. Bach’s music, compared to its predecessor, is as new as a locomotive compared to the horse and cart; but both Bach’s music and the locomotive represent a happy blend of two or more ideas that existed before. Both have combined existing elements in a new way. There is no basis for claiming a distinction between material and immaterial culture systems in terms of the novelty of their creations. In both cases, accumulation means replacing the old with the new, which is itself composed of the old. Finally, if this thesis means that only in material culture is there a progressive change towards perfection, the statement is again very debatable. Is German beer a more perfect example of material culture than Roman

[35] M.L.Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (New York, 1926) pp. 302

[36] See M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie* (3 vols., Tubingen, 1922-1923) although he exaggerates the role of Protestantism; A. Fanfani, *Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism* (New York, 1936).

[37] See, among the many Hindu sources, *The Vishm Puranma*, trans. of H.H. Wilson (5 vols., London, 1864-1877) vol. V, pp. 55, 162, 195; and vol. I, p. 114.

wine? The answer is simply a matter of personal taste - it cannot be decided objectively and scientifically. The same can be said about the latest fashion in clothing, food and fuel, compared to the old one. If we had the courage to believe, many of us would prefer the old-fashioned clothing, our mother's cooking and the wood fire, to the many modern forms of these material cultures.

This is true even of more complex inventions. Many of our contemporaries, including a number of scholars, would have liked the atomic bomb to have never been invented; many of us would rather get rid of the turbulent, threatening, and noisy planes and missiles if we could. If in an increasingly complex life they have become almost inevitable, it does not mean that we have to make a virtue out of necessity. Even a large number of the inhabitants of the city do not see any virtue in the need to live in the crowded houses of the big cities, with all their hustle and bustle, their dirt and shine, their fascination and their deadly monotony. Likewise, many people don't think they feel better in the extremely monotonous life of a modern factory than their grandparents on the farm felt.

Conclusions

All this shows that as soon as an investigator introduces the principle of *the best*, he/she abandons the field of scientific objectivity and begins to assess his/her personal preferences. From the point of view of a killer and perhaps an inventor, the atomic bomb is a better instrument of destruction than its predecessors; from the point of view of humanity, and especially of the victims, it is an infernal invention. The position of those who object is at least as justified as that of its followers. The same can be said of other inventions. Judging by the rapidly rising rate of suicides, mental disorders, and destructive wars of the twentieth century, it is clear that this century of great technological progress has not made humanity happier or more at peace with life.

On the other hand, on the basis of this subjective preference, a better case for *progress* could be made by the progress of intangible culture. There are few people who are inclined to reject the latest astrophysical cosmology and return to the Ptolemaic system. After the emergence of the great religious and ethical systems, few want to return to primitive animism, fetishism, and religious totemism. After the great philosophical systems, we no longer aspire to return to primitive philosophies. After Bach, Mozart and Beethoven, we can hardly return to the ordinary, uncultivated song. After the great historical works, we can no longer accept the primitive fantasy stories.

If such reversals occur to the more primitive, they occur in both material and immaterial cultures. The war destroyed many parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and returned them to a material culture even worse than that of many primitive tribes. Somewhat similar recurrences also occur from time to time in intangible culture.

All these considerations and empirical evidence show the injustice of dichotomous theories of progress and lagging behind. At best, they fall into the well-known mistake of elevating a particular fact to the rank of a universal rule.

As a general conclusion, we can say that dichotomous theories, with all this criticism, have contributed a lot, by analyzing some fundamental problems of sociocultural reality, to the knowledge of this reality, by their valid clarifications on some problems as well as by their *enlightened errors*.

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